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‘Because it is my name! Because I cannot have another in my life! How may I live without my 
name? I have given you my soul, leave me my name!’ 
-John Proctor, The Crucible- 
I  THE COMMERCIALISATION OF THE CELEBRITY BRAND AND THE   
 EXPLOITATION THEREOF 
(a)  Introduction 
On their feet an exuberant, capacity crowd of 81000 fans in the Santiago Bernabeú Stadium chant 
his name. He appears out of the dressing room tunnel. Real Madrid’s obsession. “Ronaldo!” 
“Ronaldo!”. The game is underway. Twenty-two players fight over the ball, but he always remains 
the centre of attention. “Ronaldo!” “Ronaldo!”. Three time Ballon D’Or winner, the greatest 
footballer on earth. The most expensive footballer in history. “Ronaldo!” “Ronaldo!”. He scores the 
match-winning goal: His 234th, a La Liga record. “Ronaldo!” “Ronaldo!” Net worth: $310 million. 
Brand endorsements: $28 million. Twitter followers: 39 000 000. Instagram followers: 38 000 000. 
Facebook likes: 108 000 000. The most liked person on Facebook. Cristiano Ronaldo - the CR7 
brand. A cultural-, sport- and fashion icon. 
In 2015 Universal Pictures release a documentary, simply titled ‘Ronaldo’. I anxiously await its 
release. After weeks of waiting I now sit glued to the screen. I am mesmerised by the man’s talent, 
fame, fortune and global attraction. A while into the film, my admiration subsides. I’m grappled by 
an uncomfortable confusion. Am I watching the life of a person or the sale of a product? Is this a 
human, as I, or is this a manufactured brand? The stars in my eyes fade as I come to a slow 
realisation: I’m not watching the life of a person anymore, I’m watching a conduit for the 21st 
century blurring of personality and property. He is the truth of the commercialisation of the 
celebrity brand. 
My ethical petition is this: 21st century culture is one where celebrities become products - and 
nobody seems bothered by it. Besides Ronaldo one can turn to the life of Kim Kardashian for proof 
hereof. Kardashian had an ambition: to be rich, famous and a global brand. Arguably talentless, 
Kardashian grew her brand, through often dubious actions, to become a universally recognised 
product. But this isn’t an ethical discussion 
The first requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond with the actual feelings 
and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.  1
I fully agree with Holmes. In a society obsessed with personal brands, selfies, self-indulgence and 
materialism; my subjective sensibilities can’t stand in the way of the proper functioning of the law. 
With the continuous evolution of Roman society, the boni mores constantly re-invented itself to 
adapt to changing public values. As Brand J stated: ‘The boni mores and considerations of public 
policy are not static concepts’.   2
In the information age, millennials abounding, it is exciting to watch societal developments unfold. 
At the forefront of cultural movements are your popular leaders - the Kardashians, Ronaldo’s and 
Rihanna’s. As aristocrats in feudal times stayed in power, our cultural kings and queens seek to 
ensure their continuing reign and expansion of influence.  
Celebrities’ prominence in our daily lives cannot be underestimated. It is therefore quite hard to 
imagine that little has been written about the confluence of celebrity and the law. Celebrity law, 
particularly the mercantile element thereof, deserves greater attention. Celebrity’s freely use their 
image to make money - these actions must be governed by an established body of law. The law 
must assist the celebrity in his commercial activities and must offer safety nets for when others 
unfairly exploit his celebrity brand.  
The topic will be divided into five points of discussion. First, the commercialisation of the celebrity 
brand will be discussed. Secondly, we will take a closer look at image rights. Thirdly, the delictual 
claim of passing off as it pertains to celebrities will be discussed. Fourthly, trade marked celebrities 
will be considered. And finally our focus will be drawn to the personality right of reputation and 
how it can be influential for the capitalist celebrity’s sake.  
It is imperative to fully understand the celebrity phenomenon. Through the ages humankind has 
naturally sought out leaders in an array of fields. We need to grapple with the oddity of this 
phenomenon to understand the position of these modern societal leaders. The commercialisation of 
the celebrity brand will be explored. As societal leaders, celebrities are in the remarkable position to 
   OW Holmes The Common Law 40.1
   Athrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom (172/2001) 2002 SCA 73. 2
utilise their renown for their own benefit. Attention economy is a concept relating to the celebrity’s 
ability to exploit his fame for commercial gain. This theory deals with the association of capital 
gain with broad-based, far-reaching image recognition. The niceties of attention economy will be 
explored to offer us insight into the ability of a celebrity to use his fame to make a profit. 
Attention economy is a theory aligning itself with image rights. Image rights are the commercial 
sales aspect of the celebrity entity, offering it legal security and a reactionary arsenal. In South 
Africa, image rights is a very vague concept. It has briefly been considered by courts and theorists, 
but no sound approach has been agreed upon. The law must adapt to a changing society. Celebrities 
are free to capitalise on their brand and a worthwhile way in protecting these entrepreneurial 
ventures is image rights. But how? The author has come to the conclusion that the United States 
approach to image rights is the most sound approach. It is understandable, seeing as celebrity 
culture is immense in the USA. Therefore their laws surrounding it are a lot more fine-tuned. This 
stream-lined approach is what drew the author to add it into the discussion. Courts in the USA have 
developed a concept called ‘personal goodwill’. The reader will recognise the term ‘goodwill’ from 
Competition law. This ‘personal goodwill’ will be one of the foundation blocks of this discussion 
and will lend itself effectively to fit in with other chapters. 
Thereon following we will consider recent case law wherein celebrities looked to protect their 
commercial interests through the delictual claim of passing off. Passing off claims instituted over 
the use of a celebrity brand is a very new concept and will make for insightful reading. It is under 
the umbrella of passing off that celebrity Rihanna sought the protection of her celebrity brand 
against the unfair exploitation thereof by third parties. Passing off is a well-established legal 
instrument that can be very useful to the celebrity.   
A next pillar of the discussion is one that is particularly fascinating. Celebrities - left, right and 
centre - are registering themselves as trade marks. For the first time in the 100+ years of the 
existence of trade marks; names, faces, gestures and voices are counting themselves among trade 
mark applications. These intellectual property concepts used to only find application with products 
and marks, but now they are applied to the commercial value of human beings. 
A personality right which can effortlessly be incorporated into the legal protection of the celebrity’s 
attention economy, will be considered. This is the celebrity’s right to reputation or a good name. 
Closely linked to the commercial value of a celebrity is the opinion of the community of him. Were 
he to be viewed in a bad light, his commercial value will fall. Were the celebrity to believe that 
someone is infringing on this personality right of his by defaming him, he can institute a claim 
against said person. This right will protect the celebrity’s good name and therefore his attention 
economy. 
The celebrity can thus look to legally protect the commercial exploitation of his brand within the 
merits of image rights; the remedy of passing-off; the registration of a trade mark; and the 
personality right of reputation. 
This topic has the ability to easily slip out of the control of the author, therefore it will be pinned 
down to the following method: 
Not a lot of cases deal with this topic in South Africa. Our courts have briefly touched on the topic. 
Most cases considered will therefore be foreign but their exploration will be of great worth to the 
South African theorist. 
The purpose of this dissertation is: 
• To explore the phenomenon that is celebrity; 
• To engage in a discussion wherein the commercial exploitation of human beings is an acceptable 
practice in our modern society; 
• To establish the remarkable concept of attention economy as a topic of discussion in South Africa;  
• To incorporate concepts of law that have previously been reserved for proprietary matters to 
matters of human identity;  
• For celebrities in South Africa to have a more thorough understanding of the legal implications of 
the exploitation of their personalities for monetary gain;  
• To explore image rights in South Africa and lament the lack of clarity surrounding it; 
• To establish the usefulness of the American approach to image rights; 
• To establish the concept of ‘personal goodwill’; 
• To explore the delictual claim of passing off within the ambit of the discussion; 
• To explore the registration of celebrities as trade marks; and 
• To show how the personality right to a good name can be useful to protect the celebrity brand.   
(b)  Understanding celebrity 
Modern fixation with celebrity isn’t new. When held up against history, fame and infamy is as old 
as man itself.  It is in our DNA, Fischoff  holds, as social animals, to look to alpha males and 3
females  and to request them to lead the pack. He believes the we are sociologically preprogrammed 4
to follow natural leaders.  
Leaders are integral to organised societies and admiration is a natural component of human nature. 
Strength, beauty and wit have always been traits elevating some above others. The type of leader 
often depends on the collective philosophy. He is a reflection of that which his community places 
emphasis on. Celebrities are colourful elaborations of our cultural identity.   5
In hunter-gatherer times the strongest, quickest hunter was the foregoing leader. And so too, power 
lay with the most imposing warriors. As man evolved, nomadic groups became vested communities. 
The surviving man gave way to the thinking man. Cogito ergo sum. Early man’s questions about the 
mysterious led to the elevation of religious figures as leaders. Communities craved leaders and 
chiefs, kings, pharaohs and emperors took the mantle. Artists, scientists and philosophers in early 
enlightenment periods also saw the limelight. Elevated figures weren’t idle to cement their status 
either. Egyptian pharaohs created monuments so that generations to come would remember their 
name. Persian kings had citizens bow down to them in religious fashion. Religious leaders 
promoted themselves as sons and voices of gods. These examples, in particular, are early situations 
of the promotion of the self for the commercial exploitation of personality. Celebrities have, to a 
large extent, in our society, replaced monarchies and deities.  6
   C Carr‘A new age of celebrity worship’ available at www.webmd.com, accessed on 01 September 2015.  3
   The author will herein after make use of the masculine pronoun ‘he’ as reference to both genders. 4
   G Turner Understanding Celebrity 24. 5
   C Rojec Celebrity 52. 6
Another explanation is also as simple as pure curiosity. The masses are curious as to how the 
elevated individual attained his status. We identify and admire his abilities, deciding that if we work 
on those particulars we would also receive recognition. 
The birth of celebrity commercialisation can be traced back to the advancement of communication 
methods in the early 20th century. The rapid growth of printed media and cinema, coupled with 
urbanisation, lured larger audiences to pay attention to the lives of celebrities. The commercial 
production of celebrity was placed at the disposal of virtually everyone.  Photographs and cinema 7
made it a lot easier for aspiring celebrities to have a further reaching influence on society and 
accordingly boost their commercial brand.  
Marilyn Monroe was perhaps the turning point. She was the earliest, most successful, human brand 
creation.  Prior to her, i.e. before the 1950s, celebrity lives were hidden in large part from the public. 
Limited information was available on celebrities before her, but Monroe bathed in the limelight. 
Her portrait was used as a magnificent sales tool, she was a creation of master marketeers. Details 
of her private life was conveyed to the public and this had a significant positive impact on her 
commercial worth. Not only the glittering aspects, but also the ugly messes of her life, played off in 
the public eye. Her vulnerability and humanity fascinated her followers and her glamorous and 
contorted legacy prevails to this day. Her image was a well-manufactured product.  
In modern society, celebrity fixation has become a drug. A confluence of forces - technology, mass 
media and the global village - has made celebrity worship easier and more common. It is a stream-
lined, well thought out industry. Public relations- and marketing houses are larger-than-life 
operations. The manufacturing of celebrity almost always sits in the hands of a remarkable group of 
‘inventors and mechanics’: managers, financiers, agents, publicists, coaches, market strategists and 
marketeers. They are responsible for producing a wide variety of ‘products’ - politicians, sport stars, 
artists, writers, business- and religious leaders. These ‘inventors’ use a particular strategy to sell 
their product to the world: research into market potential is done; an audience to whom the aspiring 
celebrity should appeal to is identified; the celebrity’s concept and story is defined; the celebrity’s 
   C Rojec Celebrity 53.7
appearance is reworked to fit the market; additional product development is done; advertising 
campaigns are set up and distribution outlets are thought out.    8
Reference is once more made to Cristiano Ronaldo, the Portuguese superstar. Were he to post 
something to his Facebook page, it means that 108 000 000 people will potentially see it. Alongside 
this, tabloids regularly publish what celebrities post on social media - thus extending his reach. 
Were Ronaldo to post on Facebook: ‘Here is a photo of my face and I have autographed it. Buy it 
for $10’. With the click of a button he has launched a further reaching media campaign than any 
brand marketeers can hope for. Were 0.1% of these followers to decide to buy the Ronaldo image, 
108 000 images will be sold and the Ronaldo brand will make a $1 080 000 gross profit. That is a 
remarkable achievement. Celebrities are lucrative investments and the law must take cognisance 
hereof. 
Kim Kardashian, American reality show celebrity, has been called a smart businesswoman.  9
Forbes  state that ‘Kim Kardashian has monetised fame better than any other’. Kardashian’s 10
market penetration was somewhat unorthodox: a sex tape of her was released in 2007. Shortly 
thereafter she signed a reality TV show deal with E! Entertainment and the rest is history. The topic 
of ‘personal goodwill’ will be discussed later on, but, in short, Kardashian has monetised her 
identity on a massive scale. As the Apple brand is worth millions, the Kardashian brand is too. 
Attaching the Apple name or logo to any product immediately raises its value. Adding the 
Kardashian name to any product does the same.  
Today she has 26 million Facebook likes; 53 million Instagram followers; 37 million Twitter 
followers; and an estimated net-worth of $85 million. An accolade to self-branding, in 2015 she 
published a book called ‘Selfish’ comprised entirely of selfies she has taken over the years. And as 
all products who want to remain relevant in the marketplace, Kardashian has frequently ‘upgraded’ 
herself. Extensive plastic surgery; risqué clothing and photographs; highly publicised weddings and 
child births; the Kardashians are keeping up with the consumers. 
   M Hamlin, P Kotler, I Rein, M Stoller High Visibility: Transforming your personal and professional brand 39. 8
   A Alston ‘Kim Kardashian-West: Brilliant Businesswoman?’ available at www.liberalamerica.org, accessed on 9
 4 November 2015.
   Available at www.forbes.com, accessed on 4 November 2015.10
The reinvention of Miley Cyrus, the American singer, is another case in point. As Vodacom 
rebranded from blue to red; Cell C from red to black; Cyrus, a human being, was totally rebranded. 
Her Southern-girl charm, complete with wholesome family values was an attractive brand for 
families and tweens. Her brand boasted movies, albums and merchandise akin to the typical Disney 
star. Through interviews she appeared to be a reserved, moral outstanding good girl.  
That brand was binned by her marketeers and replaced in 2012 with a well thought-out, high risk 
rebranding. Grown up now, her brand needed a way to stay relevant. She was rebranded as a 
member of the American Gansta-hip-hop movement. Comparing her current brand to her Disney 
one is impossible, they are stark opposites. In interviews it appears as if Cyrus had a total 
personality change between 2012 and 2013. Building her image around her sexuality, drug use and 
public provocations, Cyrus’s is regarded as one of the most successful rebranding campaigns.  Her 11
brand-worth today: 46 000 000 Facebook likes; 24 million Twitter followers; 32 million Instagram 
followers; and a net worth of $150 000 000. 
With social media, celebrities are a-plenty. Its not just the movie stars and sportsmen who are 
famous anymore. Returning to the South African celebrity market, the author didn’t even know who 
Caspar Lee was before he properly researched him. Lee is a 21-year old Knysnan YouTube 
personality, insta-celeb, vlogger,  and businessman. The young millionaire has a keen awareness of 12
how to utilise social media for his own benefit, posting videos and selfies, with underlying designer 
endorsements never far off.  Lee has, like Cyrus and Kardashian, built a recognisable brand for 13
himself that appeals to a particular target market. Were he to endorse certain products, his fan base 
will be enthralled with said product. 
Obsession with the private lives of others is as old as gossip itself. Tabloids exist for the sole 
purpose of peering into private lives. So, with mass media, celebrities increase in significance, 
potency and magnetism. Private lives become tradable commodities. With mass- and social media 
we can trace the exact moment someone escapes the masses and joins the enclaves of celebrity. He 
   A Arruda ‘Miley Cyrus Rebranding’ Forbes 05 September 2015 available at www.forbes.com, accessed on 5 11
 November 2015. 
   A video blogger. 12
   LA Hunter ‘South Africa’s YouTube millionare’ Times Live 26 June 2014 available at www.timeslive.co.za,  13
 accessed on 04 November 2015.
is no longer just one of us but now becomes one of the few. These few are magnets for attention - 
attention means money - and so, the whole concept of attention economy will be investigated in 
greater detail. 
(c)  Attention economy 
The capacity to attract attention is a form of capital. Franck  calls celebrity the status of being a 14
major earner of attention. Like capital often produces more capital, well-knownness tends to 
generate even more well-knownness. Franck  refers to celebrity repute capital as ‘attention 15
economy’. Rein  recognises a celebrity as one whose name has attention-getting, interest-riveting 16
and profit-generating value. He states that high visibility means a great deal of economic activity 
revolves around the attention-holder. 
Name recognition plays a substantial role in publication and as such, the more widely a name is 
known in a particular field, the easier it is for that name to receive more attention over lesser-known 
names come publication.  There is of course a logical agenda behind this for the publisher: the more 
known the name aligned with the publication, the more the publication sells. The celebrity needs the 
publication platforms of the publisher to boost his capital; and the publisher needs the big names to 
sell his publications. Gains through publication for both celebrity and publisher will lead to new 
projects with even more attention capital. The film industry is a case in point of this activity. 
Production houses obsess over having big name stars play in their films. The bigger the name in the 
film, the more cinema tickets are sold. A remarkable example of the economical influence of a 
celebrity on a company was when Michael Jordan, legendary basketball player, returned to play 
basketball, the stocks of the companies he endorsed, Nike and McDonalds, increased by roughly $1 
billion each.  17
The capacity to attract attention is a lucrative asset in a knowledge-based society. Information is key 
to publishers, whether it be in film, radio, television, advertising campaigns, political campaigns or 
   G Franck Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit 100. 14
   G Franck Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit 10115
   M Hamlin, P Kotler, I Rein, M Stoller High Visibility: Transforming your personal and professional brand 14.16
   M Hamlin, P Kotler, I Rein, M Stoller High Visibility: Transforming your personal and professional brand 16.17
advocacy movements. The aligning of organisations such as the United Nations with superstars 
such as Angelina Jolie, David Beckham and Emma Watson for humanitarian campaigns, has seen 
large-scale investments made by the public into these endeavours. Adding Emma Watson’s name to 
the UN Women HeForShe campaign has seen that campaign become a global sensation.  Attention 18
draws attention. 
As social interaction becomes denser, more competitive and over-populated, visibility and 
recognition beyond one’s immediate circle becomes increasingly significant and lucrative. The 
rewards attached to the accumulation of attention capital are endless in our post-industrial, 
information-based society. As a certain writer put it  
It looked too hard to work your way up [to become a successful writer] and the pay was terrible. 
But I found a shortcut: If I became famous, I will never have a problem getting my work 
published!  19
Celebrities are dependent on proper management and in turn, celebrities, when properly managed, 
create profit. Turning a nobody like Stefani Germanotta into Lady Gaga was a win-win situation for 
both her and the marketeers behind her. Fame dramatically increases earning capacity. The earning 
capacity of a celebrity can thus be a massive commodity. Celebrities and marketeers invest years of 
practice to develop a public personality which reaches marketable status. The celebrity identity, 
embodied in name and likeness, is the fruit of his labours. It is his property, his goodwill.  20
These publications, whether it be on television, magazines or political talks; speak to the public’s 
desires, needs, wishes and aspirations. Celebrity advocacies and preferences influence consumption 
patterns and are thus a major economical attraction. Celebrities have vast economic networks and 
aren’t indifferent to expanding these. A celebrity actor can, off the set, be anything from a brand 
ambassador for a cosmetics company to a political tool used to win votes. This celebrity is paid 
handsomely for his commitment, garners more attention for his name and increases his monetary 
worth. A product is more recognisable if it becomes associated with a very recognisable face.  21
   HeForShe is a solidarity campaign run by UN Women. It was launched in 2014 with Emma Watson as  18
 spokeswomen and as of 10 March 2016 has more than ten million subscribers worldwide.
   S Wilson ‘Gossip Girls’ Good Weekend 22 November 2008 available at www.goodweekend.co.au, accessed on 19
 09 November 2015.
   HI Berkman ‘The right of publicity - protection for public figures and celebrities’ 539.20
   One cannot help but associate George Clooney with Nespresso. 21
Celebrities are lucrative investments and a bright stockbroker would realise this. The value that 
merchandise sales, concerts, CD’s and advertising adds to the economy cannot be denied.  
We have now seen how the commercialisation of celebrity works. This discussion will now focus 
on the protection afforded to the celebrity brand. The author considers the celebrity’s attention 
capacity and asks: how does the law protect this celebrity brand? Through the portals of image 
rights, passing-off, trade marks and personality rights. The discussion will thus take for granted that 
yes, the use in public of a celebrity name can’t be contained,  but the celebrity must be free to 22
exercise a certain measure of control over his attention economy. The economic value of attention is 
of such importance in modern society that there undoubtedly exists a need for its legal regulating 
and management. 
   In like standing the use of brands such as Coca-Cola, McDonalds or Woolworths in common publishing, such 22
 as writing or conversation can’t be contained. 
II  IMAGE RIGHTS 
Image rights - or rights pertaining to the image - have been defined as  
[T]he ability of an individual to exclusively control the commercial use of his name, physical/
pictorial image, reputation, identity, voice, personality, signature, initials or nickname in 
advertisements, marketing and all other forms of media. The celebrity often earns a substantial 
license fee or royalty that is paid for the privilege of allowing his name to be used for 
promotional purposes.  23
From this definition it is quite clear that image rights are perfect to utilise in the case of the celebrity 
seeking to protect and exploit his attention economy. The celebrity attention economy is a two 
legged entity: on the one hand the celebrity’s economic value resides in himself, his personal 
goodwill;  on the other he can attach his name, through endorsements, to products and services that 24
he and third parties launch in the marketplace.  
A second definition, offered by Blackshaw,  is a valuable addition to the first. It defines image 25
rights as  
[A]ccess to the services of the personality for the purposes of filming, television (live and 
recorded), broadcasting (live and recorded), audio recording, motion pictures, video and 
electronic pictures (including but not limited to the production of computer-generated images), 
still photographs, personal appearances, product endorsement and advertising in all media. 
Blackshaw’s definition draws attention to the actions which may be taken to employ personality for 
economic gain. Neethling  calls image rights ‘personal immaterial property’. Image rights thus 26
convey the right to use the personality’s name, likeness, autograph, story and accomplishments for 
practical, commercial purposes. Mostert  recognises the important societal role image 27
merchandising plays in South Africa. He states that the use of personal image in connection with 
sponsorships, merchandising, licensing and endorsements have a major influence on our society and 
economy. 
   R Cloete Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa 176. 23
   Personal goodwill will be discussed later in this chapter.24
   IS Blackshaw and RCR Siekmann (eds) Sports Image Rights in Europe 7. 25
   J Neethling Van Heerdeen-Neethling’s Unlawful Competition 115. 26
   F Mostert ‘The right to the advertising image’ (1982) 99 SALJ 413.27
A number of well-known celebrities constantly appear in television, print and radio advertisements 
for products or services. It is estimated that celebrities in South Africa can garner as much as R2 
million through endorsement contracts per year. Many celebrities can ask up to R100 000 a day for 
endorsements of company products.  However, celebrities and agents are in a constant battle for 28
payments from these companies. A source informed the writer that she, as an agent representing 
South African celebrity singers, struggles immensely with producers over payment of monies due to 
her clients. She states that her clients can easily fetch R20 000 per day for performances in 
advertisements, but are belittled by marketeers only willing to pay as little as R2000 per day. 
Therefore, the opportunity for the exploitation of attention economy goes lost for many South 
African celebrities.  29
Unfortunately, little attention is paid to image rights in South Africa. The underdevelopment of 
image rights in our country has led to many advertisers using celebrity images without consent.  30
South African courts has not had much occasion to grapple with the issue of unauthorised celebrity 
merchandising. In fact, the term ‘celebrity merchandising’ seems not to be recognised under South 
African law as having any special meaning or validity. This was noted by Harms JA in South 
African Football Association v Stanton Woodrush (Pty) Ltd t/a Stan Smidt & Sons & Another  31
where he stated that  
Character merchandising doesn’t add anything to South African law as the protections provided 
by the law are based in existing protection under copyright, trade marks and unlawful 
competition. 
Louw  submits that this approach is wrong. He dismisses the argument given the practical 32
commercial realities and needs of the stars which cannot be ignored. He argues that the ignoring of 
image rights up to now is an oversight and a mistake. He believes that our law needs to come to 
grips with the commercial reality of the South African entertainment and professional sports 
   A Louw Sports Law in South Africa 467. 28
   A Louw Sports Law in South Africa 467. 29
   Khumalo v CycleLab (Pty) Ltd 2011 ZAGP 56. This case will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.30
   2003 (3) SA 313 (SCA) at 321E-G.31
   A Louw ‘Suggestions for the protection of star athletes and other famous persons against unauthorised  32
 celebrity merchandising in South African law’ 272.
industries. He holds that celebrities should have access to a real and effective remedy in cases of 
infringement of image rights. He believes in the recognition of a basis of protection that should be 
available to stars who are confronted with the practice of unauthorised exploitation of their fame 
and of aspects of their persona for financial gain.  The time is ripe for legal reform to protect 33
celebrities through image rights, says Louw.  34
How does Louw suppose legal reform should take place in this regard? He says we should look to 
the United States of America. South African law does not expressly recognise a ‘personal goodwill’ 
as is the case in the United States. 
In perhaps the closest case to have come to image rights of a celebrity in South Africa, the court in 
Kumalo v Cycle Lab (Pty) Ltd  considered the use of a photograph of a former miss South Africa 35
by a business in an advertisement without her consent. This case was a perfect opportunity to 
independently investigate image rights. 
Kumalo is a celebrity who built a successful career as a model, television presenter, magazine editor 
and businesswoman. CycleLab is a retailer of bicycles and cycling products. In 2007 she was in the 
CycleLab store to purchase a bicycle and cycling paraphernalia. While trying on cycling helmets, a 
man approached her and took her photograph. CycleLab used the photograph in an advertisement 
for its store, which was published in a magazine as a ploy to advertise that celebrities buy their 
merchandise. Kumalo insisted that she did not agree to the taking of the photograph or to its further 
use for advertising purposes. Her anger stemmed from the fact that the defendant had sought to 
exploit her image for commercial purposes without her consent. Kumalo duly instituted proceedings 
in the South Gauteng High Court where she claimed for patrimonial or special damages which she 
alleged to have sustained as a result of the defendant’s unauthorised publication of her image. 
   A Louw ‘Suggestions for the protection of star athletes and other famous persons against unauthorised  33
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In reference to Neethling,  Borushowitz J stated that what had taken place in this instance was a 36
falsification of the true identity of Ms Kumalo. Her image was used to create the false impression 
that she had supported the product.  Use of her image in this manner constituted a violation of her 37
right to identity. The appropriation and misuse of her image was deemed wrongful by the judge. He 
held that its use would’ve been considered, by persons of ordinary and reasonable sensibilities, to 
constitute an iniuria which is deserving of legal protection.  
Pertaining specifically to Ms Kumalo’s celebrity status, Borushowitz J stated that, although, as a 
public figure, she must accept that her appearance in public will attract more attention, she still 
retains the right to be protected against an infringement of her right to identity. He stated that it is 
universally accepted that public figures or celebrities have a legitimate expectation of protection 
and respect for their private lives.  He concluded that the appropriation by the defendant of the 38
plaintiff’s image by using her photograph in an advertisement cannot be justified on the basis that 
she is a public figure or celebrity. Her claim was thus settled in her favour.  
It is fair - and sad - to state at this time that the Kumalo-case can be regarded as the locus classicus 
of South African image rights! This shows how underdeveloped the concept is in South Africa. 
Borushowitz J, however, did offer sound reasoning and did incorporate an adequate measure of 
consideration in his judgment. This case could well prove very fruitful in the future development of 
image rights in our country. 
The author fears that South Africa might face a case where a celebrity is severely defrauded due to 
undue exploitation of his image. What then? Our courts will have to look overseas for sound 
doctrines. Louw is indeed right. The land of the free and the home of the brave, deeply vested in its 
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 2011. 
identity as a supporter of individual liberty, is one of the best options for any court looking to 
expound on image rights. 
Image rights in the United States of America are a well-established set of legal principles. In the 
USA can be rest assured that his attention economy receives adequate protection and that he can 
therefore exploit his image for commercial gain without fear of undue ramifications. It has as 
objective the recognition of a personality right as an interest which has commercial value and the 
infringement of which will cause patrimonial damage.  The American courts speak of a right to 39
‘personal goodwill’.   40
To find a definition in American law for the recognition of this personal goodwill, the author looks 
to Rodrigues’  definition of it 41
‘Personal goodwill’ in identity are rights that offers a person goodwill that would otherwise only 
subsist in a business or brand. It is the force that attracts one to a famous individual. The tables 
have turned: a person has a commercial value given his fame. 
In Haelan Laboratories Inc v Topps Chewing Gum Inc  the exploitation of the commercial value of 42
of baseball players without their consent, the court recognised the right of a person to control the 
publicity value of his likeness. It held that a celebrity must be able to confer exclusive licenses 
which are protected to the exclusion of others on a legal basis.  The right to ‘personal goodwill’ in 43
the USA is a property right in the commercial use of one’s persona. ‘Personal goodwill’ is alienable, 
may survive death, and has been expanded to protect a person’s voice, gestures and mannerisms.  44
   Waits v Frito-Lay Inc 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir 1992) California. Herman Miller Inc v Palaze Imports and  39
 Exports Inc 270 F.3d 298 (Michigan). Prima v Darden Restaurants Inc 78 F. Supp 2d 337 (D.N.J. 2000) (New 
 Jersey). 
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When one considers ‘personal goodwill’ as an immaterial property right, as with the right to the 
goodwill of a business, image rights find legal appropriation. Value increases with fame. Fame is 
the attractive force that brings in custom. Fame elevates sales. The goodwill of the celebrity, as legal 
entity,  is comprised of particular components centrally tied to his image. Regarding the personality 
of this peculiar entrepreneur as a commodity, well founded value is given to the celebrity’s 
commercial acclaim. 
Save for this right to ‘personal goodwill’, licensing, through contracts, soundly stipulate image 
rights in the USA. The position is that the employment of celebrities for endorsements will include 
provision for the control of image rights. Contractual provisions regarding the licensing or 
assignment of the image rights of celebrities may commonly include aspects such as an undertaking 
by the licensor to perform promotional services; an undertaking by the licensee to provide 
assistance to the licensor in preventing infringement of image rights by third parties; an undertaking 
by the licensor to refrain from licensing identical or similar rights to third parties; and an 
undertaking by the licensor to refrain from certain behaviour (such as public drunkenness or sexual 
impropriety) that may negatively affect commercial value.  45
The extensive coverage of such contracts clarify the position of all parties bound to the attention 
economy of the celebrity. American law recognises that celebrities’ have definite commercial value 
attached to their brand. Isaac Farris, nephew of Martin Luther King Jr. said 
  we’re not trying to stop anyone from legitimately supporting themselves but we cannot allow our           
brand to be abused.  46
This assertion of Rev. King’s image by his family is a legal claim to a share of proceeds from the 
unauthorised sale of t-shirts, badges and other merchandise which depicted the activist alongside 
Barack Obama. Farris’ qual was a capitalist assertion - the family lamented the lack of profit they 
felt were their due as legal owners of the Martin Luther King Jr. image. 
   RL Yasser Sports Law: Cases and Materials 6th ed (2003) at 598-600. 45
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Were we to follow Louw’s advice and develop an approach similar to that of the United States, 
image rights in South Africa might arise out of its slumber. The author outrightly states that it is ill-
advised for any celebrity to wish to rely on an image rights mechanism at this time, were he 
confronted with injuries to his brand. Other chapters in this discussion offer more sound and 
established solutions to the celebrity cause. 
The author holds that we must move toward the recognition of such a personal goodwill in South 
Africa. It would outrightly recognise a prima facie inference of a commercial interest. Personal 
goodwill operates in a similar fashion to the goodwill of a business. In other branches of law the 
concept of earning capacity is well established. A persons earning capacity gradually develops 
through one's energy, initiative, studies, experience, financial gains and public exposure.  47
A plaintiff's proof of the value of his goodwill, would be a question of fact. A significant goodwill, 
as identified in intellectual property and unlawful competition, would need to exist. It would indeed 
be rather easy to identify, seeing as the defendant merchandiser recognises himself that the celebrity 
is of such noteworthy interest that his attachment to the product would boost sales. Unlawful 
infringement would exist were the merchandiser knowledgeable of the fact that he is depending on 
the goodwill of a celebrity to make sales without the celebrity’s permission. Simple authorisation 
for the use of the image would be needed. Unauthorised use constitutes an infringement. Fair use of 
celebrity image and goodwill ought to remain a valid defence. Reference to the boni mores will 
determine whether or not the goodwill of the celebrity has unduly and unlawfully been infringed.  
South Africa would be the wiser to look across the Atlantic and consider the development of 
‘personal goodwill’. Therewith, celebrity’s must seek legal assistance when contractual negotiations 
are underway. They must ensure that contracts soundly stipulate implications of endorsements and 
the use of the celebrity image. Only then will the celebrity be able to, in an appropriate fashion, use 
his attention economy for his own economical gain. Image rights will be properly developed in 
South Africa and this will be an exciting addition to our current body of law. 
   J Neethling Van Heerdeen-Neethling’s Unlawful Competition 114. 47
III PASSING OFF AND THE CELEBRITY 
(a)  Introducing passing off to the celebrity brand 
Within the strands of Intellectual Property law and unfair competition lies the delictual claim of 
passing off. This concept has historically been applied to goods, marks and symbols - not people. 
Only within the last couple of years has this peculiarity occurred. The use of the passing off 
mechanism to protect the celebrity brand offers insight into the economical intentions of celebrities 
and the extent taken to stay in control of personal branding. Passing off is an effective way to guard 
one's ‘personal goodwill’ against unfair exploitation. In essence it is a legal instrument used to 
combat third parties from riding the gravy train of the celebrity’s success. Unfortunately, it is not so 
much a pre-emptive resource as it is a reactionary one. 
Passing off occurs when traders use distinctive marks of other parties to create the impression that 
their performances are similar to the competitor’s well-known performance; and thereby they 
deceive consumers into accepting their performance.  In essence then, passing off infringes a 48
party’s right to attract custom in that his distinctive marks are used by another party to coax 
customers away from his brand in an unfair, unacceptable and unlawful manner.  49
To be successful with a passing off claim a plaintiff must satisfy the following requirements: 
• that the plaintiff trader has a reputation in a particular mark or symbol; 
• that there is a misrepresentation by the defendant that his goods or services are in some way 
associated with those of the plaintiff; 
• that there is a likelihood that the misrepresentation will lead to consumers being confused into 
believing that the business of the defendant is connected to that of the plaintiff; and 
• there must be damage to the plaintiff’s goodwill.  50
For purposes of our current discussion, each of these four requirements will be discussed separately. 
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South African courts have no exposure to instances where celebrities institute claims for passing off 
where persons unfairly and unlawfully exploit their brands. There has, however been overseas cases 
that have dealt with these interwoven situations. An English case concerned the world-renowned 
celebrity Rihanna. In Robin Rihanna Fenty and Others v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd and Another  51
the plaintiff alleged passing off, stating that the defendant had unlawfully used her celebrity brand 
for their own commercial gain. 
The law of passing off is an instrument to protect the business reputation of a trader. The business 
reputation of a trader forms part of the ‘goodwill’ of his business.  Goodwill is that attractive force 52
which draws custom.  Goodwill can be a many number of things but for purposes of the current 53
discussion the relevant one is reputation.   54
(b)  Reputation and passing off 
In Premier Trading Company (Pty) Ltd and Another v Sportopia (Pty) Ltd  reputation was defined 55
as being 
the opinion which the relevant section of the community holds of the plaintiff or his product. 
The plaintiff’s reputation can be associated with certain symbols under which his product is 
marketed. 
The celebrity is greatly dependant on a positive reputation. Without a sizeable reputation, in an 
extensive geographical area,  among a significant amount of consumers,  the celebrity’s business 56 57
ventures can easily fail. In Adcock Ingram Products Ltd v Beecham SA (Pty) Ltd  it was held that 58
the plaintiff must prove that the features of his identity and the marks and symbols linked thereto, 
has acquired a meaning or significance. This entails that his reputation must exist at the time when 
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the infringing conduct takes place.  In other words, he must already be recognised as having 59
celebrity status at the time when his brand is unfairly exploited. Geographical area would therefore 
be more of a market sector than a physical area. The number of persons that are enough is a factual 
enquiry and varies from case to case. To prove a reputation the plaintiff will have to offer evidence 
of his sales and marketing. Market surveys can be used to substantiate the claims.  In GPS 60
Restaurante BK v Cantina Tequila (Mexthe authorcan Connection CC) and Others  it was stated 61
that the existence of a reputation can be identified through the prevalence of advertising 
expenditures. It is therefore submitted that a strong indication of reputation for a celebrity can be his 
social media followers, products sold bearing his name or advertising campaigns in which he 
participates. 
The celebrity must realise, off the bat, that he himself - his identity, name and attributes - constitute 
the goodwill of his business. With proper utilisation of these elements of his persona he can pursue 
wealth in a smart way. Therefore, it would truly aggravate the celebrity who wishes to exploit his 
attention economy if a third party uses his celebrity brand, without consent, for his own gain. That 
celebrity would be wise to make use of the passing off action to not only prohibit that third party 
from using his brand unlawfully but also to seek damages for injury to his reputation. 
The celebrity is aware of his attraction force and with proper research knows what the market wants 
from him. The consumers - and particularly his fans - hope that the celebrity enters the marketplace 
with products or services attached to his name. The celebrity marketeers create marks or symbols  62
that are to be linked to the celebrity brand. These marks and symbols go hand-in-hand with the 
celebrity identity. When the celebrity then enters the marketplace his image becomes inseparable 
from his marks, symbols and the products or services linked thereto. The celebrity has used his 
favourable reputation to now participate in the economy as a provider. 
It is important to note in the Premier Trading Company definition that the opinion of the 
community is either that of the plaintiff or his mark. This means that the producer and the products’ 
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reputations can be separated from each other. The producer is an individual entity apart from his 
marks and products. Therefore, the celebrity, as established earlier, has an own attention economy. 
The marks and products he manufactures, spawning from his attention economy, has a separate 
reputation from his. The capitalist celebrity producer, however, cannot separate himself entirely 
from his products or else his business ventures would be in vain, for what use is his celebrity status 
then?  
To understand reputation in the celebrity case a simple illustration can be used: 
CELEBRITY MARK  PRODUCT CONSUMER 
It is the celebrity who is the origin or foundation of the reputation. The celebrity has built up his 
reputation through various means and now seeks to use his attention economy for financial gain.  63
Through careful planning he creates certain marks or symbols that are to be used as badges of origin 
on the products or with the services. Hereon following a decision is made as to the avenues of the 
marketplace which are planned to be infiltrated. Then the products or services bearing the celebrity 
mark are distributed to the consumer.  
Were a defendant to misuse the positive reputation of the plaintiff, it can have a dire impact on the 
positive view consumers have of the celebrity. As stated in Premier Trading Company  64
A false representation by the defendant about the symbol used by the plaintiff may encourage or 
induce potential customers of the plaintiff in the defendant’s favour, believing that they were 
patronising the plaintiff but were in fact patronising the defendant.  
The defendant who misuses the celebrity plaintiffs positive reputation for his own gain is acting in 
bad faith. This conduct cannot be condoned and the celebrity has a right to object thereto. These 
defendants, often smart businessmen themselves, see opportunities to ride the coattails of reputable 
businessmen and do so hoping that it’ll profit their own pockets. Even if a defendant is unaware of 
the fact that he is acting in bad faith, by using the celebrity image for his own gain, the celebrity 
may object hereto. This is, as established in chapter 2, so, because the celebrity has the right to 
maintain control of his celebrity brand. 
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In Kean v McGivan  the court held that courts would not protect non-traders. Therefore the person 65
alleging passing off must be a commercially active trader who seeks a profit out of the use of the 
trader’s mark. For our current discussion this would have the implication that, in the first instance, it 
must be confirmed that the person is in fact a celebrity. This could be established through 
submitting evidence that the celebrity plaintiff has in fact a significant reputation and is well-known 
among a large number of persons. 
Klopper  identifies a number of scenarios in which reputation can be an issue. The author has 66
narrowed it down to those he believes are applicable for purposes of the current discussion. 
Firstly, we will look at the use of one’s own name as a means to attract custom. Numerous 
celebrity’s use their own name as the marks or symbols attached to their business endeavours. 
Fancy or unique names - such as Riri  -  are especially tangible in these situations.  67
In Policansky Bros Ltd v L&H Policansky  the court held that the party had established, through his 68
advertisements and the quality of his goods, that his name is valuable as a trade name. The plaintiff, 
Mr Policansky, as a manufacturer of goods, had become known in the marketplace as the maker of 
quality goods. The court held that those particular quality goods are readily associated with 
Policansky’s personal name. The court held that another person may not use his name in connection 
with similar goods unless he makes it perfectly clear to the public that he isn’t selling the same 
goods as the original manufacturer and that he isn’t connected to him.  
In Boswell-Wilkie Circus (Pty) Ltd v Brian Boswell Circus (Pty) Ltd  the court held that you may 69
not call your business by any name which is likely to mislead the ordinary run of person into 
believing that it is or has connections with the business of somebody else. If a person has 
previously, through his advertisements and through the quality of his goods, made his name 
valuable as a trade name so that his name has become distinctive both of his goods and of himself 
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as the manufacturer of those goods, and if his goods have come to be universally known in the 
market by his name, then his name is said to have obtained a secondary meaning. 
In Button v Jenni Button (Pty) Ltd  the court held that a person has a property right to the use and 70
enjoyment of his own family name as well as in carrying on a business and selling his goods in that 
name. In this case, however, the appellant had sold her name and goodwill to the respondent and 
consequently the continued use by her of her own name would infringe the right to the goodwill 
attached to the JENNI BUTTON™  trade mark which then vested in the respondent. Jenni Button 
was found to not be entitled to make use of her own name in the course of her business for as long 
as that business operated in the same field as that of the respondent.  
The second scenario Klopper  identifies is the appearance of a business. A saying in modern 71
English colloquia is ‘she is the face of so-and-so’; for example ‘Rihanna is the face of H&M’. This 
is the situation where a celebrity endorses a third party’s product. If Rihanna endorses her own 
business it means that ‘Rihanna is the face of Rihanna’! Rihanna’s appearance is the origin of the 
business. She is the business. Without her celebrity likeness, the business cannot exist. It is the 
distinct features of the celebrity that offers her her business goodwill. Her attributes are of such a 
nature that, were they imposed upon, it would be to the detriment of her uniqueness as a brand.  72
The third scenario Klopper  identifies is where the defendant trader imitates the get-up or trade-73
dress of the products of the plaintiff trader. Products are presented on the shelves of retailers in 
particular forms. The browsing consumer is made aware of the differences between the get-up or 
trade dresses of each product he passes. So, once more, smart marketeers work hard to ensure that 
their products stand out to the consumers. Trader’s have the right to use the get-up or trade dress of 
their products to distinguish theirs from those of other traders and to enhance the profits of their 
companies through such strategies.  74
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In adidas AG v Pepkor Retail Ltd  the court was asked to consider whether or not the respondent 75
retailer had imitated the get-up of the plaintiff’s manufactured shoes. The appellant has a trade mark 
registered over shoes bearing three-stripes vertically: 
The respondent in turn sold the following shoes in their stores: 
 
The appellant stated that its three striped shoes had a strong reputation and that the respondent was, 
through the use of two and four stripe marks on its shoes, committing passing off. The court held 
that get up must not be generic or common must have an element of uniqueness to have a reputation 
of its own. The court held that the respondent had acted wilfully to create a false impression as to 
the origin of the shoes, seeking to deceive consumers into believing that the products are related. In 
the same breath, a trader can design the get-up of his products to look similar to that of the 
celebrity’s. He can also use models in his advertising campaigns that resemble the attributes of the 
celebrity. 
In Die Bergkelder v Delheim Wines  the court held that the form, likeness, colours and other 76
attributes of the get up must be distinct from other products. The court stated that certain generic 
traits cannot receive special protection for they cannot develop a distinct reputation of their own. 
Herein we find some worthwhile advice for our capitalist celebrities. Inherent to every individual is, 
of course, certain features. As human assets, celebrities are able to hold a set position among 
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competing brands. The celebrity must ensure that his brand is of a nature which can easily be 
identified from others in the market. Lesser known celebrities must therefore pay attention to the 
fact that they must establish a strong brand in the market place otherwise a court may dismiss a 
passing off claim, holding that their brand has no truly unique traits. 
(c)  A misrepresentation must occur 
In the marketplace consumers can easily be confused by the sheer scale of products or services at 
their disposal. This volatile space is there for the taking of smart marketeers. Products can be 
deceptively similar, creating a representation that the marketeers’ product is something which it 
isn’t. Companies can coax consumers into believing that their product bears a particular likeness or 
quality given its similarity to another trader’s product. 
In adidas AG v Pepkor Retail Ltd  the court held that, in matters of misrepresentation, the degree 77
of distinctiveness between two products is of utmost importance. The court held that it must be 
asked whether or not the public will believe that the similarities or differences of the names, 
attributes or get-up of the products will lead them into believing that the products are connected to 
each other. It held that traders must make it perfectly clear to the public that the articles that they are 
selling are in no way those of the other trader’s. The defendant must, at the outset, show that the 
products are his own and that there is no probability that the ordinary purchaser will be deceived.   78
(d)  Confusion must be present 
In Capital Estate & General Agencies (Pty) Ltd and Others v Holiday Inns Inc and Others  it was 79
held that when an enquiry is launched as to whether or not passing off has occurred, one asks 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that members of the public may be confused into believing 
that the business of the one is connected with that of another.  The question that needs to be asked 80
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when it comes to confusion, is whether or not a person who casually considers the marks would be 
likely deceived by their similarities.  81
The test to determine whether or not confusion is present was discussed in Plascon-Evans Paints 
Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd.  The court held that  82
• regard must be had to the similarities and differences between the two marks;  
• an assessment must be made of the impact which the defendant’s mark would make upon the 
average type of customer who would be likely to purchase the kind of goods; and 
• a comparison must be made, considering the sense, sound and appearance of the marks. 
The primary motive of a trader to have its own trade mark is to distinguish his products and services 
from similar products and services.  They are crucial to establish a trader’s goodwill and have 83
inherent economic value. In Premier Trading Company  the court held that actual confusion need 84
not occur, only the possibility of confusion must arise. 
In Adcock-Ingram Products Ltd v Beecham SA (Pty) Ltd  the court considered strikingly similar 85
marks of both the plaintiff and defendant. It held that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s 
use of the features in the mark was not only likely, but calculated to deceive; and thus aimed at 
causing confusion and injury to the goodwill of the plaintiff’s business. The defendant must’ve had 
the aim of increasing his own sales by tricking innocent consumers into buying his product when 
the consumer in fact sought the product of the plaintiff. 
Establishing confusion in a case is a question of fact.  The relevant circumstances of the matter 86
must be taken into consideration and if the evidence establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood 
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that confusion will arise, passing off may be present.  Passing off doesn’t necessarily require that 87
the two traders are trading in the same area of the market but it can be an influential factor 
nonetheless.  88
Two Australian matters will help to cross the bridge between passing off and celebrity passing off. 
These matters dealt specifically with confusion and could be useful for a South African court in the 
future. In the first case, celebrity ballroom dancers sued on the basis that a photograph of them 
dancing had been placed, without their consent, on the cover of a music album of dance music. In 
Henderson v Radio Corporation  the celebrities reasoned that the record distributor purposefully 89
used their images on the album cover to deceive the public into believing that they endorsed it. The 
court found that any given consumer would believe that the dancers had recommended the record 
and therefore found that the use of the dancers’ identities was a misrepresentation which gave rise to 
passing off liability. The court went so far as to, when dealing with the impact of the use of the 
celebrity images, use the word ‘robbed’ to describe the misuse of the celebrities image-based 
goodwill. This strong word choice emphasises the seriousness of passing off in these cases. Many 
celebrities largely depend on their personal brand for income. Their image is the product that they 
market and sell. Were a party to use that image without their consent, it amounts to robbery of their 
goodwill.  
In the second case even fictional celebrities have qualified for passing off protection. In Children’s 
Television Workshop Inc. v Woolworths (N.S.W.) Ltd  the defendants were restrained from 90
marketing plush toys alleged to be representations of the Sesame Street television programme 
characters Big Bird, Oscar the Grouch and the Cookie Monster. In that case Helsham CJ stated that 
passing off is prevalent if  
The relevant deception is that the public will believe that the defendant creates a connection 
between the two businesses, where it has been stated that ‘no man may lead [anyone] to the 
belief that the business which he is carrying on has any connection with the business carried on 
by another were this not the case’.   91
   Capital Estate & General Agencies (Pty) Ltd and Others v Holiday Inns Inc and Others 1977 (2) SA 916 (A). 87
   Capital Estate & General Agencies (Pty) Ltd and Others v Holiday Inns Inc and Others 1977 (2) SA 916 (A). 88
   1958 1A IPR 620. 89
   1981 1 N.S.W.L.R 273. 90
   1981 1 N.S.W.L.R 273. 91
The public will believe - if this is prevalent - if it appears as if the celebrity endorsed the defendant’s 
product without it being so - passing off might well be an efficient tool to use in countering the 
defendant. The celebrity plaintiff must thus be able to establish that he has a reputation and that 
confusion is at hand - and so he might well succeed with a passing off claim.  
(e)  Damage to goodwill 
A plaintiff hoping to succeed with a passing off claim will need to prove that he has locus standi. 
Our courts are inclined to hold that only the actual holder of the trade name or mark may institute 
an action for passing off.  Were passing off evident, the infringed party has the Actio Legis Aquiliae 92
at his disposal for damages  or he may seek an interdict to prohibit the party from continuing with 93
the unlawful associations.  94
In Reckilt and Coleman SA (Pry) Ltd v SC Johnson and Son (SA) (Pry) Ltd  it was said that, to 95
identify whether or not passing off has indeed taken place, the court must consider the facts at hand. 
The judge must transport himself from the courtroom to the marketplace and stand in the shoes of 
the purchaser. He must take into consideration the actual circumstances in which sales are likely to 
take place, the nature of the customers and the likelihood of improper articulation - and so damage 
must be calculated.  96
   Easyfind International v Instaplan Holdings 1983 (3) SA 917 (W).92
   Atlas Organic Fertilisers v Pikkewyn Ghwano 1981 (2) SA 173 (T).93
   Royal Beech-Nut (Pty) Ltd t/a Manhattan Confectioners v United Tobacco Co Ltd t/a Willards Foods  94
 1992 (4) SA 118 (A).
   1995 (1) SA 725 (T).95
   Oude Meesters Groep Bpk and Another v SA Breweries Limited; SA Breweries Ltd and Another v Distillers  96
 Corporation (SA) Ltd and Another 1973 (4) SA 145 (W). 
(f)  Robyn Rihanna Fenty and Others v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd (t/a TopShop) and another  97
Robyn Rihanna Fenty, or Rihanna, as she is known publicly, is a pop singer superstar. She has sold 
more than 40 million albums and has massive endorsement agreements with Nike, Gilette and LG. 
With an estimated net worth of US$120 million,  the 27 year old has, save for the commercial 98
success of hits like Diamonds and Umbrella, built an empire around the sale of Rihanna-endorsed 
perfumes, clothing, accessories and marijuana products.   99
On the endorsed clothing one might find photos of Rihanna or references to songs of hers. A tank-
top with Rihanna wearing a bikini, posing next to a pool, currently costs R450 on the Rihana Store! 
Were she not on the shirt, the price would surely be a lot less. Regarding the perfumes, known as 
‘RiRi’, the commercial value thereof lies in the statement on the bottles: ‘By Rihanna’. As with the 
shirt, its undeniable that were this statement not thereon, the perfumes price would drop 
significantly.   100
Noticeable on all merchandise authorised by the Rihanna brand, is a particular mark: 
The ‘R Slash’-mark is used extensively on authorised goods, usually coupled with the name 
‘Rihanna’ or a photographic depiction of the singer. In 2012 TopShop started selling t-shirts in its 
stores displaying a recognisable image of Rihanna: 
   2013 [EWHC] 2310. 97
   ‘Pinching Pennies? Rihanna is worth $120 million’ Daily Mail 8 July 2014 available at www.dailymail.co.uk, 98
 accessed on 15 December 2015.
   The official Rihanna store can be viewed at www.rihanna.fanfire.com. The Rihanna marijuana products,  99
 known as MaRihanna, will include varieties of marijuana edibles, vapours and concentrates. ‘Rihanna  
 launching range of Marijuana products’ TimesLive 19 Nov 2015, available at www.timeslive.co.za, accessed on 
 15 December 2015.
   A bottle of ‘RiRi’ perfume currently costs R925 on the Rihanna Store website.100
 
Neither Rihanna or her authorised licensees offered their consent for the use of the depiction by 
TopShop. At a retail price of R440, TopShop sold roughly 12000 t-shirts in the 5 months in 2012 
that it was on its shelves. This led to Rihanna instituting a claim of $5 million in damages for the 
unauthorised use of her image. The claim  being one for passing off. 
The central question in this case was whether or not passing off had occurred in that TopShop had 
misrepresented that they were aligned to the Rihanna/‘R’ brand, thereby confusing the public. 
Rihanna contended that she had a reputation and personal goodwill in connection with her business 
activities and further, that the use of her image on the t-shirt amounted to a misrepresentation and 
was likely to deceive members of the public into believing it was authorised by her. She further held 
that the misrepresentation made the shirt more attractive and so played a material part in the 
decision of the public to buy it. Rihanna held that the building of her ‘R’ brand and her image had 
taken a lot of hard work and it was unfair for a party to use that image without her consent.  
Kitchin LJ held that a substantial number of consumers were likely to be deceived into buying the t- 
shirt because of a false belief that it had been authorised by Rihanna. He held that this damaged her 
goodwill. He held that it would result in a loss of sales to her online merchandising business and 
also represent a loss of control over her reputation in the fashion industry. 
Kitchin LJ held that consumers are often aware of the fact that pop stars endorse products and are 
drawn by celebrity endorsements. The judge held that consumers buy products based on personal, 
subjective, aesthetic appeal - a love for a celebrity could satisfy that appeal and persuade a 
consumer to buy a t-shirt.  
An important question was whether or not Rihanna’s image had become such a common, generic 
one that the power to distribute her image to TopShop outweighed her right to control her image. 
Was her likeness of such a public nature (such as that of Elvis referenced to by Kitchin LJ) that 
TopShop could legitimately use it without fearing passing-off? The court said no, Rihanna still had 
a unique, distinctive identity and goodwill as a celebrity. 
Celebrities are identified marks in and of themselves, with commercial value added to their brands. 
Kitchin LJ stated that it is a tough call to state that celebrities will have total, universal control over 
the use of their image. He held that  
No one can (whether celebrity or nonentity) complain simply of being photographed. But the celebrity 
does have the power to conduct the business of his branding in the fashion that he sees fit and no third 
party may unduly infringe hereupon. The central issue therefore is one of whether or not unfair 
exploitation is taking place. 
Kitchin LJ held that the law of passing off isn’t designed to protect a person against fair 
competition. He stated that the courts can take judicial notice of the fact that it is common for 
famous people to exploit their names and images by way of endorsement. The reason large sums are 
paid for endorsement is because those in business have reason to believe that the lustre of a famous 
personality, if attached to their goods, will enhance the attractiveness of those goods to their target 
market. TopShop sought to do this - they didn’t obtain the necessary consent to do so lawfully.  
Taking everything into consideration, the judge held that TopShop’s sale of the t-shirt without her 
consent, amounted to passing off and Rihanna succeeded with her claim. 
IV  TRADE MARKS AND THE CELEBRITY 
(a)  Introducing trade marks to the celebrity brand 
The Trade Marks Act defines a trade mark as 
a mark used or proposed to be used by a person in relation to goods or services for the purpose 
of distinguishing the goods or services in relation to which the mark is used or proposed to be 
used from the same kinds of goods or services connected in the course of trade with any other 
person.  101
In the United States and the United Kingdom it has become quite common for celebrities to register 
their names and individual traits as trade marks. Paris Hilton™, David Beckham™, Sarah Palin™, 
Kylie Jenner™, Roger Federer™, 50 Cent™ and Kim Kardashian™ are just some examples of 
registered celebrity trade marks. Then there are registrations of celebrity associations: Paris Hilton 
registered ‘That’s Hot’™ - a saying she used in a reality TV show; boxing announcer Michael 
Buffler registered his saying ‘Let’s get ready to rumble’™; athlete Usain Bolt’s ‘Lightning Bolt’- 
pose where he bends a knee and extends his arms; rugby player Johnny Wilkinson’s distinct kicking 
stance; and American Footballer Tim Tebow’s knelt prayer before each game are all registered trade 
marks. Nothing in the American Trademark Act of 1946 or the United Kingdom Trade Marks Act of 
1994 prohibits persons from registering their names, attributes or actions from trade mark 
registration. Neither does our local Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993. And so, we have today this 
remarkable new aspect of trade mark law.  
The registration of a celebrity’s name, actions or attributes as trade marks allows him to defend 
himself against unauthorised use thereof. It signals to third parties that, before the celebrity brand 
can be used for commercial purposes, the celebrity’s consent must be obtained. It is also a clear 
indication that the celebrity seeks to use his image for economic gains and that he is open to joint 
business ventures where his image is to be exploited. 
   Section 2(1).101
The law of trade marks can be used by the celebrity as a more-advantageous option than passing 
off. Trade mark registration will be pre-emptive, while passing off is definitely more reactionary. 
While with passing off the celebrity would need to prove reputation, confusion and damages, with 
trade marks he will simply have to refer to his registration document.  
Registered trade marks give to the owner, once registered, exclusive rights to use that mark in 
relation to goods or services for which it is registered. The owner can, once registration is 
completed, prohibit any other party from registering for the same or similar marks. He can 
furthermore sue anyone who uses the same or similar mark to his in relation to similar products.  102
It is easier to bring a trade mark infringement action than a passing off or personality rights claim. 
And a trade mark registration - being a matter of public record – has a very strong deterrent effect 
too. The registered trade mark and the goodwill associated therewith, as stated continuously,  a 
valuable asset. In fact, a South African celebrity already discussed, Basetsana Kumalo, the plaintiff 
in Kumalo v CycleLab,  has registered her name as a trade mark so as to ensure future protection 103
of her image! 
For a celebrity to obtain the widest possible protection under trade mark law it is important that he 
exploits his name and image during his life and in a manner which denotes a trade source. He must 
use the registered trade mark symbol (™) or publicise legal notices. By maintaining strict control of 
his trade mark, it would ensure the distinctiveness of his name and image for the goods for which he 
has registered. If a celebrity gets a trade mark for his/her name that does not mean that they can 
prevent others from using the name with regard to all goods and services. All it means is that they 
can prevent others from using the trade mark in respect of those classes of goods and services in 
which they have been registered. 
   Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993. 102
   31871/2008. 103
In Button v Jenni Button (Pty) Ltd,  a case concerning another South African celebrity mark, 104
fashion designer Jenni Button was interdicted from using her own name for purposes of conducting 
business in the retail industry. This came after she undertook an agreement with Jenni Button (Pty) 
Ltd to transfer the goodwill vested in her name mark to the company. After the transfer, Ms Button 
established a new clothing and fashion brand, PHILOSOPHY, but continued to use her name in 
connection with the PHILOSOPHY brand. The company objected to this name use. Ms Button 
raised Section 34(2)(a) of the Trade Marks Act  as a defence. This defence, rightly so, failed, 105
seeing as the Jenni Button name wasn’t a registered trade mark.  
It would, however, have been of utmost significance to the current discussion had the Jenni Button 
name in fact been registered as a trade mark. Ms Button argued that she could not be restrained 
from using her own name in respect of her business. The court held that our law provides for the 
bona fide use of your own name, provided that it is done honestly in the market place, but in this 
case Ms Button had signed away certain rights over the use of her name. The court held that the 
Jennie Button mark, as well as all goodwill associated therewith, was validly transferred to the 
purchasers and that her continued use of her name in relation to clothing amounted to passing off. 
Had the Jenni Button name been Jenni Button™, a trade mark in the hands of Jenni Button (Pty) 
Ltd; and Ms Button continued to use it in the marketplace, she would’ve committed a trade mark 
infringement for the use of her own birth name.    
Our centrally discussed celebrity, Cristiano Ronaldo faced an uphill battle himself over the 
registration of his CR7 mark. An American fitness instructor, Christopher Renzi, successfully 
registered the trade mark CR7 in 2009. Renzi adopted the mark based on his own initials. In 2014 
he instituted a claim against Ronaldo who was using the CR7 mark for his own commercial 
activities. Ronaldo petitioned to the United States Patents and Trade Mark Office to cancel the trade 
   2008 BIP 242 (C). 104
   Act 194 of 1993. 105
mark, but it refused. Renzi instituted a civil claim against Ronaldo and the case of Christopher 
Renzi v JBS Textile Group A/S and Cristiano Ronaldo  is still to be decided on.  106 107
Another unsuccessful registration of a celebrity trade mark was the morally frowned upon one of 
singer-parents Beyoncè and Jay-Z. In 2012 the music superstars submitted a trade mark application 
to have the name of their infant daughter, Blue Ivy, registered as a trade mark. The registration of 
the baby’s name was held to be a clever move by the parents for the commercial benefits it holds. 
Plans for baby products under the Blue Ivy brand were already in place when the application was 
dismissed. Blue Ivy is perhaps an appealing name to the parents for its aesthetic value, but financial 
advisors and agents may have weighed in on the decision of the child’s naming. The superstars 
realised their own selling power and their offsprings’ as well. They are marketable brands in 
themselves and cleverly devised a way to make their daughter one too. A Blue Ivy trade mark 
(belonging to an event organising company) was already registered and additional grounds for 
refusal included that its registration would be unethical. The critique was levelled at it being 
morally unacceptable to register a human being as a trade mark who has no say in the matter for 
themselves.  108
It is thus evident that celebrity registration as a trade mark isn’t a given. The celebrity will need to 
jump through the same hoops that the ordinary trade mark applicant would. They will need to 
persuade the Trade Marks Office (CIPC in South Africa) that the trade mark they are trying to 
register is original, distinctive and not one others might reasonably need to use. 
   U.S. District Court for Rhode Island, No. 14-cv-00341 2014. 106
   A Chung ‘Soccer star Ronaldo’s trademark case suspended’ Yahoo News, available at www.yahoo.com,  107
 accessed on 13 December 2014. 
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(b)  Registering a trade mark in South Africa 
Distinctive marks are used to distinguish an enterprise, goods and products or services from those of 
other traders. Imitation of these distinctive marks amount to infringement of the registered mark 
which allows the proprietor of the mark to institute proceedings in terms of the Trade Marks Act.  109
To qualify as a trade mark, a mark must be used to distinguish itself from other goods or services. It 
must have a definite distinguishing factor.  It provides a means by which consumers are able to 110
identify a particular product.  A person’s name has to be so distinctive that the consuming public 111
automatically thinks of a particular person when hearing that name. 
The registration of a celebrity name is possible if it is distinguishable from other names. 
Registration of common names might have trouble being registered, were one to once again take 
note of the reservations against legal protection of generic terms. Therefore, the celebrity must have 
a mark he wishes to have registered that is registrable. The celebrity can register his name as a 
trademark and duly identify in which sectors of the marketplace he wishes to use his registered 
mark. The Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for 
the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 1957, to which South Africa acceded, identifies 45 
classes of products/services into which trademarks can be placed and registered. These range from 
cosmetics to clothing to crockery. Were the celebrity to wish to market, under his name, any kind of 
goods, he would find in the Nice Classification a heading under which his products can be 
registered. 
   Act 194 of 1993.109
   Section 9.110
   Triomed (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group pl 2001 (2) SA 522 (T) 532-533.111
(c)  Infringement of a registered trade mark 
(i)  Infringement of Section 34(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act  112
This section states that the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be infringed by -  
the unauthorised use in the course of trade in relation to goods or services in respect of which 
the trade mark is registered, of an identical mark or of a mark so nearly resembling it as to be 
likely to deceive or cause confusion.  113
Were the celebrity’s trade mark infringed upon he can, in the first instance, contest a section 34(1)
(a) infringement. He must prove that the use of his mark by the third party was without his consent. 
The third parties who have permission to use the celebrity’s mark may only use it for the actions for 
which they have received permission from the celebrity.  In Television Radio Centre (Pty) ltd v 114
Sony Kabushika Kaisha t/a Sony Corporation  the court held that one would need to consider the 115
nature of the mark, the nature of the goods and the purpose and extent of the unauthorised use.  It 116
held that the unauthorised goods must be competition to the original goods.  The infringing mark 117
must be used as a trade mark in a commercial sense. Non-commercial use doesn’t qualify in terms 
of this section. It must be used to create the impression that there is a material link between the 
original and unauthorised marks.   118
   Act 194 of 1993. 112
   Section 34(1)(a).113
   MCT Labels SA and another v Gemelli CC 1991 (1) SA 54 (D).114
   1987 (2) SA 994 (A).115
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In adidas AG and Another v Pepkor Retail Ltd  the court asked whether of not Pepkor’s use of the 119
two and four stripes were used to distinguish their goods from adidas’s within the same vein of 
trade. The court found that the similarity of the adidas and Pepkor shoes meant that they were 
indeed trade mark infringing. Therefore in the celebrity’s case, the third party must show that his 
product isn’t similar to that of the celebrity’s and that it is wholly distinguishable. 
The celebrity must prove that there is a likelihood that confusion will take place as a result of the 
use of the infringing mark. He must show that the infringing mark is either identical to his 
registered mark or so nearly resembles it that it will deceive consumers. To compare the registered 
and infringing marks, courts will look to the test set out in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van 
Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd  120
The plaintiff need not show that customers are, or have been actually confused by the marks, but 
he must show that a substantial number of potential customers will be deceived or confused by 
the similarities between the marks. 
In the adidas AG -case the respondent held that the fact that the plaintiff’s three stripe trade marks 121
are so famous means that the likelihood of deception or confusion is reduced as customers would 
immediately know that it isn’t adidas’ trade mark but the mark of Pepkor. The court responded 
hereon by holding that 
the more distinctive the trademark is, or the greater its reputation, the greater the likelihood will 
be that there will be deception or confusion. Purchasers who are used to seeing the adidas 
trademarks will be far more likely to conclude that the similar mark is that of adidas and 
consequently that the competing products come from the same source. 
Therefore, a well-known celebrity who has a registered trade mark runs a greater risk of his mark 
being confused as that of another party. A consumer can easily confuse the celebrity mark with that 
of another party seeing as he is used to see the celebrity mark.  
   (187/12) [2013] ZASCA 3.119
   1984 (3) SA 623 (A). 120
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(ii)  Infringement of Section 34(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act  122
This section states that the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be infringed by - 
the unauthorised use of a mark which is identical or similar to the trade mark registered, in the 
course of trade in relation to goods or services which are so similar to the goods or services in 
respect of which the trade mark is registered, that in such use there exists the likelihood of 
deception or confusion.  123
The primary difference between section 34(1)(a) and 34(1)(b) is that the latter provides protection 
for ‘similar’ goods. This entails that the trade mark owner must prove that the goods or services 
used under the infringing mark are similar enough, not identical, to his trade mark. This subsection 
has a further reach that subsection (a) but is more difficult to prove. To determine whether or not 
goods are similar, the court considers the nature of the goods; the proposed use of the goods; and 
the trade channels through which the goods will be retailed. 
When using this section the celebrity would need to show that the competing goods are used in a 
manner that, even if the connection between the two goods isn’t direct, its sale will have a negative 
impact on the marketability of his own goods. He must show that his trademark is dependent on its 
unique nature and that the opposing party is infringing on the unique state of his mark.  
(iii)  Infringement of Section 34(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act  124
This section states that the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be infringed by - 
the unauthorised use in the course of trade in relation to any goods or services of a mark which 
is identical or similar to a trade mark registered, if such trade mark is well known in the 
Republic and the use of the said mark would be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be 
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the registered trade mark, 
notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception.  125
   Act 194 of 1993. 122
   Section 34(1)(b). 123
   Act 194 of 1993. 124
   Section 34(1)(c).125
This section concerns itself with the dilution of the goodwill of the original trader. The celebrity 
must have developed a significant advertising value and selling power. This must have come about 
due to its extensive use. This selling power would have to have become diluted because of the 
unauthorised use by the third party.  126
It exists to protect the investment, time and effort the trade mark owner has put into making his 
mark well-known. Trade marks are diluted through the blurring of the advertising abilities of the 
mark by an infringing mark. The infringing mark must be identical or highly similar to the original 
trade mark.  Dilution by blurring occurs where the use of the mark by unauthorised third parties 127
makes the trade mark more of a generic term than a unique, descriptive product. Blurring doesn’t 
differentiate between whether or not the unauthorised mark is used in direct competition to the trade 
mark or in any other sector.  128
The celebrity’s mark must be well-known in South Africa. In McDonald’s Corporation v Joburgers 
Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd  the court held that ‘well-known’ is a term related to the reputation 129
of the mark. To determine reputation, therefore to determine well-knownness, one has to consider 
whether a substantial number of members of the public are aware of the existence of the mark.  130
Dean  expands on well-knownness stating that the degree of recognition of the proprietor’s mark 131
in its and the defendant’s trading areas and channels of trade is an influential factor in terms of 
proving subsection (c). 
The question of fair use of a well-known mark was considered in Laugh It Off Promotions CC v 
South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom of 
Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae).  The Constitutional Court held that ‘fair use’ can be 132
qualified if the trade mark is being used in a manner which is an act of freedom of expression. The 
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court held that to determine whether or not a trade mark has been used fairly, for purposes of 
freedom of expression, it must consider the purpose, nature, extent and impact of the limitation of 
free expression. On the other hand the plaintiff would need to demonstrate the likelihood of 
substantial harm to his trade mark, which would be to his detriment and which would amount to 
being unfair.   133
   O Dean and A Dyer (eds) Dean & Dyer: Introduction to Intellectual Property Law 151.133
V  PERSONALITY RIGHTS AS A MEANS TO PROTECT THE CELEBRITY BRAND 
Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk  recognised a right to human identity 134
as a self-standing personality interest. All persons have a right to regard themselves in a particular 
fashion and to convey to the world a personal image of their choosing. A misrepresentation of a 
persons image can thus constitute an infringement of identity. As such, you build your reputation on 
the identity you choose. You build your personal brand on the persona you wish to convey to the 
world. The misrepresentation of a persons opted identity is prima facie wrongful and constitutes an 
iniuria. 
(a)  Recognition of the right to a good name (reputation) 
A celebrity’s good name or reputation (fama) is the regard which he enjoys within the 
community.  The opinion of a celebrity held by a society has a definite effect on his commercial 135
value. The association, characteristics and deeds of a celebrity are primary motivations for this 
social judgement.  The community is responsible for this social judgement and this judgement is 136
made based on moral constructs.  Were the community to frown upon the actions of a celebrity,  137 138
his reputation would be in a bad state. Were the celebrity’s make-up to fit in well with the 
communal convictions, his repute would be positive and this would have a direct, positive effect on 
his commercial value.   139
One’s good name can therefor be regarded as an asset - personal goodwill. This close link to the 
intimate identity of a person means that a persons reputation deserves protection as an independent 
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  For example, were the celebrity to be caught in scandals involving drunk driving, racist comments or sexual 138
 debauchery. 
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aspect of his personality.  The protection of the right to a good name falls within the ambit of both 140
the law of personality and the law of defamation. Reputation, within the personality law, is afforded 
Constitutional protection under the umbrella of the right to human dignity.  141
The threshold inquiry as to whether or not a reputation is tarnished is to ask whether the deed or 
statement is capable of being defamatory.  The test is to determine whether the reasonable person 142
would think less of a person because of the supposedly ill-found action.  143
(b)  Defamation 
(i)  An opposition to reputation 
Directly opposed to the right of a good name is the assailing thereof through defamation. 
Defamation often comes about through the Constitutional right of freedom of expression.  This 144
right is stretched to its limits by some.  
In Khumalo v Holomisa,  which was a case that included a political celebrity, O’Regan J said that  145
When considering the constitutionality of the law of defamation we need to ask whether an 
appropriate balance is struck between the protection of the freedom of expression on the one 
hand and the value of human dignity on the other.  146
This has a dramatic implication for the level of protection offered to the reputation of a celebrity. 
Celebrities are ‘public property’.  Most of them live their lives in the limelight. Shouldn’t they 147
then be thick skinned about public criticism? They appear to welcome the attention and so it must 
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be asked, how sensitive should they be when a person is exercises his freedom of expression to 
criticise them? When will statements about a celebrity constitute defamation? And can these 
otherwise defamatory comments, ever be justified?  
(ii)  Qualification of defamation 
Defamation is the wrongful, intentional publication of words or behaviour concerning another 
which has the tendency to undermine his status, good name or reputation.  Defamation is a 148
specific form of an iniuria.  There must be an act: the publication of words or behaviour. There 149
must be an injury to personality: the words or behaviour must be of a defamatory nature. There 
must be wrongfulness: the personality right to a good name must be injured. There must be intent: 
animus iniuria is the final requirement that must be satisfied.   150
The mingling of commercial exploitation of identity and the exploited parties reputation was 
discussed in Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd.  In that case a magazine used the photograph of a 151
minor for advertising purposes, without her consent. This publication led to reinforcement of 
negative stereotypes of women and her personal vilification by classmates and peers. Although she 
was not a celebrity per se, this case offered valuable insight into how our courts can protect the 
reputation of a public figure.  
Her mother, as legal guardian of her minor daughter, launched an application against the publication 
of the photograph which she stated amounted to an invasion of the girl's privacy and harm to her 
reputation. The court held that when a photograph is used, without consent, for the benefit of a 
magazine sold to make profit, it constitutes an unjustifiable invasion of the personal rights of 
reputation, dignity and privacy.  The court held that, no matter how one looks at the matter, the 152
publication of a provocative photograph of a twelve year old girl simply cannot be reconciled with 
   Tap Wine Trading CC v Cape Classic Wines (Western Cape) CC 1998 4 All SA 86 (C) 107. See also Tsichlas v 148
 Touch Line Media (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 112 (W).
   J Neethling, JM Potgieter and PJ Visser Law of Personality 44.149
   J Neethling, JM Potgieter and PJ Visser Law of Personality 131. 150
   (Unreported 11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (09/11/2009).151
   (Unreported 11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (09/11/2009).152
generally accepted norms of decency and will always have a dire effect on the girls reputation.  153
The court held that the right to identity is infringed upon if the attributes of a person is used in a 
way which cannot be reconciled with the actual image that the individual would prefer to convey of 
herself. 
What is the implication of all this for media freedom? With any action for infringement of a 
subjective right, a variety of conflicting interests must be weighed against each other. With the use 
of a person's image, the rights to identity, human dignity and freedom of association of the 
individual must often be weighed against the users right to freedom of expression and freedom of 
the media. The media ought always be on hot coals when they consider using a person’s identity in 
their publications. This case laid down a better understanding of reputation and publications: If the 
publication cannot be reconciled with the true image of the person, it might in fact be an 
infringement. 
The restatement of the law laid down in Grütter v Lombard  in respect of appropriation of image 154
is of much significance. Davis J stated that, to succeed with a claim where the attributes of a person 
are used without permission, it is a requirement that the person concerned should indicate that there 
was some misrepresentation of his or her personality. This kind of infringement entails a 
misrepresentation concerning the individual. In this case it appeared as if the individual approved or 
endorsed a law firm while it was not the case. 
In this case both parties had been practising as attorneys under the name “Grütter and Lombard”. 
Grütter terminated the partnership, but Lombard continued to use the name “Grütter” as part of his 
practice. Grütter’s claim was that it was well-known that the name “Grütter” referred to him directly 
and he didn’t wish to associate his reputation with the firm any longer. 
   Even if the girl’s parents were to offer their consent, is it public policy to accept these publications and  153
 endorsements? 
   2007 (4) SA 89 (SCA) 8.154
The court found that Grütter was entitled to the protection of his identity and that his uniqueness as 
a person manifests itself in his personality, character, name and attributes. An individual should, 
therefore, have an interest in their identity and how it is used. The court went on to say that any 
unauthorised use of such identity is a violation of that person’s right to determine who should or 
should not have access to his image. The court confirmed that every individual has a right to 
identity and consequently, when such identity is violated, then one’s good name is infringed upon. 
(iii)  Requirements for liability 
Defamation, being aimed at the infringement of the celebrity’s good name, occurs if the defamatory 
statement or behaviour is conveyed in a way that a third party becomes knowledgeable thereof.  155
For defamation’s sake, publication is a necessity. Without publication the esteem of the celebrity 
cannot be diminished. According to Kyriacou v Minister of Safety and Security  the requirement 156
of publication is satisfied if the defamatory words or behaviour is known by at least one other 
person.  If one other person only needs to know about it, then mass-publication by a tabloid about 157
the  ill-doings of a celebrity can be a large scale intrusion! This disclosure can be made in writing or 
other means of representation. Internet platforms are included as ways in which publication takes 
place.  158
Were the celebrity to decide that his good name has been tarnished, defamation has occurred and his 
image has lessened in value, it would be wise for that celebrity to take the matter to court. As a 
plaintiff in court, he can challenge the assertions of the defendant publisher and so seek retribution 
and relief for those comments.  
   Whittington v Bowles 1934 EDL 142 145.155
   1993 3 SA 278 (O) 287. See also African Life Assurance Society Ltd v Robinson & Co Ltd 1938 NPD 277 295 156
 and Tsichlas v Touch Line Media (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 112 (W)120.
   In Vermaak v Van der Merwe 1981 3 SA 78 (N) the court held that even if the third party who the defendant 157
 communicated the defamatory words to doesn’t grasp the defamatory significance of the statement, the  
 defamer will still be liable for his defamation of the plaintiff’s reputation. 
   Tsichlas v Touch Line Media (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 112 (W).158
First and foremost, the celebrity must offer proof of the remarks made against him. If it is clear that 
publication has taken place, the celebrity plaintiff must prove that the defendant is the person who is 
responsible for the publication.  The plaintiff must clearly prove that the conduct was levelled 159
against him as person. This sets up the necessity for a causal connection between the words spoken 
or deeds committed and his personhood.  The defendant will be held accountable if it can be said 160
that he ought reasonably have known that there existed a possibility that a third party might become 
aware of his defamatory remarks.  161
For words or deeds to be considered defamatory, the publication must impair the individual’s good 
name and be objectively unreasonable.  Held against the boni mores, the words or deeds must be 162
deemed unsavoury. To test whether or not words or deeds are defamatory, the court asks whether or 
not, in the opinion of a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence,  the publication of the words or 163
behaviour will undermine or impair a person’s reputation. If it is so, that conduct will be prima facie 
wrongful.  The ridicule must have a definite and direct effect on the lowering of the esteem in 164
which the plaintiff is held by the community.  With the celebrity, this is often easy to ascertain. 165
Other publications will climb on the bandwagon of celebrity scathing, negative remarks will be 
levelled against him  and commercial endorsements may be removed. This has serious 166
implications for the commercial worth of the celebrity brand. It can happen that due to the 
defamatory statement, other persons (or corporations) are now less likely or completely unwilling to 
   Van Vliet’s Collection Agency v Schreuder 1939 TPD 265.159
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   Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman 1962 2 SA 613 (A) 616. See also Sutter v Brown 1926 AD 155 163 163
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   In Pitout v Rosenstein 1930 OPD 112 117 it was held that all the qualities that a man possesses must take a  166
 knock because of the defamatory words or behaviour which would thereon following have an impact on the 
 social standing of the man among his fellowmen. 
   In De Wet v Morris 1934 EDL 75 77 it was held that the fact that the statements left about such a severe  167
 tarnishing of the plaintiff’s reputation which caused societal dissociation, those statements were to be regarded 
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associate with the victim.  This public tarnishing has had a disastrous effect on the social standing 167
of innumerable celebrities. 
A particular celebrity whose reputation is constantly being attacked is South African president, 
Jacob Zuma. Mr Zuma has been the victim of a multitude of defamatory statements made against 
him in the media, social media and public forums. This unyielding assailment has resulted in dismal 
approval ratings from the South African public.  It can be said that publications of defamatory 168
statements against Mr Zuma constitute impairments of his reputation.  Some of these assertions, 169
no doubt, are justified, but others are not. It is as if a prevailing prejudice has developed around the 
man and his reputation cannot escape it. The media  are relentless in their attack on his reputation 170
and this impairs the public perception of him. 
The circumstances of each case play an important role in the determination of how the reasonable 
person would react - it is a factual inquiry.  The application of the objectively reasonable person 171
test is thus crucial for determining whether a statement or behaviour is wrongful in defamation. The 
reasonable person for purposes of defamation is deemed to be a fictitious, normal, balanced right-
thinking and reasonable human being who is neither hypercritical nor over-sensitive; and is 
someone with normal emotional reactions.  The reasonable person is someone who believes and 172
upholds Constitutional values and values the rule of law.  He is a representation of the community 173
and so the defamatory conduct is such as to be unacceptable in the eyes of all members of the 
community.  The context of the case is crucial to applying this test in an appropriate way.  174
   ‘Study: Zuma losing popularity among South Africans’ Eyewitness News 14 December 2015 available at  168
 www.ewn.co.za, accessed on 10 March 2016. 
   Unless justified.169
   In particular a certain cartoonist. 170
   National Union of Distributive Workers v Cleghorn and Harris 1946 AD 984. 171
   SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Schoeman 1962 2 SA 613 (A) 616. See also Argus Printing and Publishing 172
 Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 587.
   Sokhulu v New Africa Publications Ltd 2001 4 SA 1357 (W) 1359.173
   Botha v Marais 1974 1 SA 44 (A) 49.174
The situation in which the conduct is committed and the type of person against whom the conduct is 
levelled are telling. Thus the position of a celebrity can be different from that of an ordinary 
member of society. Once more, should the celebrity accept that he is an anomaly in society and 
must he, accordingly, be more thick skinned? The average member of the community’s approach 
will be telling. If the average member believes that the celebrity cannot be led to feel that the 
conduct is defamatory, then the court might decide against the plaintiff celebrity.  
The requirement of animus iniuria is influential to prove defamation for the celebrity plaintiff.  175
The defendant publisher ought to have had the intention to defame the celebrity plaintiff. The 
intention to defame can present itself in the form of dolus directus, dolus indirectus and dolus 
eventualis. Accordingly, the defamer’s will must be directed toward the consequence or he must 
have had the reasonable foreseeability that his conduct could cause the consequence it had. 
(iv)  Grounds of justification relating to defamation against a celebrity 
aa)  Privilege 
Privilege allows for the publication of defamatory words or behaviour and thereby excuses conduct 
from being wrongful.  Where a person has the right or duty to make certain defamatory assertions 176
public; and the persons to whom the assertions are published have a right to learn of the assertions, 
that person can justify his publication through privilege. 
In the situation of absolute privilege, the defendant’s protection is absolute and unqualified and 
liability for defamation is completely excluded. In this case, because of statutory backing, a person 
is permitted to commit defamatory conduct! An example hereof is that members of Parliament 
receive complete immunity from defamation for remarks made in Parliament or in one of its 
committees.  The provincial legislatures receive the same protection.  In parliament there are a 177 178
number of persons who can be regarded as celebrities. They include the president, vice-president, 
   Unless negligence or mistake can be proven as a justification ground.175
   National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1202.176
   Section 58(1) of the Constitution.177
   Section 117 of the Constitution.178
cabinet ministers, speaker and certain opposition leaders. The comments of Mmusi Maimane, 
Democratic Alliance leader, projected against president Jacob Zuma thus fall within the statutory 
protection offered. Were Mr Maimane to call president Zuma “not an honourable man but a broken 
man presiding over a broken society”,  he would easily have been deemed to act in a defamatory 179
way toward the president. Were Mr Zuma to try and hold Mr Maimane liable for his comments in 
parliament, the onus is on Mr Maimane to prove that he has the right to absolute privilege. 
In the case of limited privilege, a person who publishes the defamatory matter can deem himself to 
be under a moral or social duty to do so. Said person must regard themselves to have a legitimate 
interest in the publication and that the persons to whom he is publishing it to, has a legitimate 
interest in receiving said matter.  To determine whether or not the publication warrants privilege is 180
an objective question. One ought to ask whether or not the reasonable person would deem there to 
be a duty on the defamer to communicate the defamatory words or behaviour to the receivers.  181
There are a number of factors which must be taken into account to determine whether or not a 
person’s perceived moral or social duty permits privilege. In the first instance regard must be had as 
to what the relationship between the parties are and whether or not certain information (necessary 
for the defamatory remarks), given their relationship, was conveyed in confidence;  the 182
seriousness of the defamatory remarks;  and the importance and urgency of the issue in respect of 183
which the defamatory charge was made.  He must be able to show that his defamatory conduct is 184
   S Apiah “Maimane to Zuma: You are not an honourable man” Mail & Guardian 28 January 2015 available at 179
 www.mailandguardian.co.za accessed on 17 June 2015. 
   Borgin v De Villiers 1980 3 SA 134 (D) 148. 180
   Borgin v De Villiers 1980 3 SA 134 (D) at 577. See also De Waal v Ziervogel 1938 AD 112 122-123 and   181
 Mohamed v Jassiem 1996 1 SA 673 (A) 710-711.
   Carbonel v Robinson & Co (Pty) Ltd 1965 1 SA 134 (D). 182
   In this case the we can state that publications which severely tarnish the reputation of a celebrity without there 183
 being truth thereto can be deemed to be serious. Fabricated allegations injuring the reputation of a celebrity  
 cannot receive privilege. However, the exposing of truthful celebrity actions can receive privilege. Examples of 
 this would be the investigative journalism which went into exposing cyclist Lance Armstrong for his doping or 
 rugby player Joost van der Westhuizen for his extra-marital affairs. Although these are very serious allegations 
 against the reputation of celebrities the journalists receive privilege on the basis that these allegations prove to 
 be the truth and they were under a moral and social duty to communicate these truths to the public. 
   J Neethling, JM Potgieter and PJ Visser Law of Personality 147.184
relevant to and reasonably connected with the furtherance of a greater goal.  In Jasat v Paruk  185 186
the court held that the defendant transgressed the limits of privilege by acting beyond the scope of 
the subject matter to which the privilege would otherwise relate. As such, one can state that a 
journalist would be free to convey defamatory comments about a celebrity within the ambit of a 
topic that is justified,  but he may not overstep the bounds of that privilege.  187 188
bb)  Public interest 
If the defendant can prove that his remarks are both true and in public interest the otherwise prima 
facie wrongfulness of his publication falls by the way side.  These expositions must be limited to 189
the precise representations that were made, he cannot allege things for which he has no evidence.  190
Therefore, were a person to allege that a celebrity politician is guilty of fraud, only this fact and its 
necessary intricacies are worthy of protection. Lambasting slurs, additional to the founding facts, 
are free of justification protection and the defamer would have to answer for it. 
The circumstances of the case, along with the communal convictions (boni mores), will determine 
whether or not a matter is in the public interest. It is held that exposing a corrupt politician is in the 
public interest whereas doubt can be cast over whether or not the carnal activities of a pop star are 
in public interest. The merits of each case must be considered. If a broad base of the public were to 
be convinced that the pop stars conduct (for whatever apparent reason)  are in any way a matter of 191
public interest, the defamatory remarks could be justified.  
  Borgin v De Villiers 1980 3 SA 556 (A) at 578. 185
   1983 4 SA 728 (N) 733.186
   For example were the celebrity to be participant in an adulterous scandal.187
   Such as alleging certain things about the celebrity if there in fact is no evidence to support such statements.188
   National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA).189
   Verwoerd v Paver 1943 WLD 153.190
   The pop star could perhaps be viewed as a role model for some young persons and being  highly influenceable, 191
 exposure to the ludicrous behaviour of a role model could prove to be against public interest. 
In Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party  it was held that the public has 192
a definite interest in the doings of public officials, albeit so that those doings are communicated 
through defamatory remarks. This strengthens the supposition held forth that celebrities should, 
because of their peculiar position, to be more thick skinned than others. 
cc)  Media privilege 
Reports made by the media should, as an ethical rule, be fair and truthful but, if reasonable, the 
publication of untruths may be justified. Media privilege, therefore, is an exception to the 
requirement that only truthful defamatory comments may be published. Media privilege concerns 
itself with the justification of untruths and should only succeed in exceptional circumstances.  It is 193
however a requirement that the publication be made with a reasonable intention of believing the 
statements to be the truth. For the determination of media privilege justification, the boni mores 
must  be used as yardstick.  The public interest, the nature and extent of the statements, the nature 194
and societal reach of the medium used, the reliability of the source of the information and the 
necessity for the publication are all telling factors to determine this justification.  In practice this 195
means that defamatory publications made of a celebrity ought to be thoroughly analysed. In this 
analysis, if it were to be found that the statements are untruths or half-truths, it must be determined 
whether the public interest justification can hold water. Therewith, consideration ought to be had for 
the type of allegations that were made against the celebrity. Thirdly, regard shall be had as to the 
reputation impact of the statements (is the celebrity reputation severely depleted?). Finally, the 
reliability of the source (can a tabloid be regarded as a reliable source?) and the necessity for the 
publication will be detrimental to determine the justification of the publication. 
   1992 3 SA 579 (A).192
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dd)  Fair comment 
If the defamer can prove that his published comments form part of a fair comment on true facts that 
are in the public interest, the defamation may be excused as not being wrongful.  The courts set 196
forth four criteria for a party to succeed with this justification.  These criteria are 197
• The publication made must not be based on fact but must be an opinion; 
• The opinion must be fair (it must remain within reasonable limits); 
• The facts relating to the opinion must be true; 
• The opinion must be a matter of public interest. 
ee)  Consent 
Were a party to lawfully consent to the infringement of his reputation, that defamation is 
justified.  This is done in terms of the principle volenti non fit iniuria (to a willing person, injury is 198
not done).  It would be up to the defendant to prove that the plaintiff consented to the defamatory 199
publication.  
ff)  Mistake 
Were a party to bona fide believe that his conduct is lawful, he therefore has no animus iniuria in 
his actions. His will isn’t guided by an intent to harm the plaintiff. In Nyodo v Vengtas  the court 200
held that were a defendant to honestly believe his defamatory remarks were communicated for a 
lawful purpose, it can be justified that he never intended to defame and shouldn’t be held 
accountable therefore. The person commenting on the celebrity’s actions can thus justify his false 
statements were he able to prove that he made those comments by mistake. 
   National Media Ltd v Bogoshwe 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) at 1202.196
   Marais v Richard 1979 1 SA 83 (T) 89. See also Johnson v Beckett 1992 1 SA 762 (A) 778; Heard v Times  197
 Media Ltd 1993 2 SA 472 (C) 476; Crawford v Albu 1917 AD 102 105; Coetzee v Union Periodicals Ltd 1931 
 WLD 37 43.
   Bester v Calitz 1982 3 SA 864 (O) 878. 198
   Jordaan v Delarey 1958 1 SA 638 (T). 199
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gg)  Jest 
Jest is a matter highly applicable to defamatory publications. In 2008 president Zuma sued 
cartoonist Jonathan Shapiro (Zapiro) for damaging his reputation for a cartoon depicting Zuma 
preparing to rape the Lady Justice.  Zuma finally dropped the charges the day before the matter 201
was to appear in court. The newspaper publishing the article, the Mail & Guardian, in an editorial 
following the dropped charges, stated that  
cartoonists are the court jesters who make us laugh and then cry when we realise that what’s 
been drawn is often the fundamental truth or a portent of what might come to pass if the 
authorare not vigilant. The greater the freedom of the jester, the higher the democratic quotient 
of a society.  202
The test laid down whether or not an otherwise defamatory remark is one of jest is to ask whether or 
not the reasonable person would deem the comments as pure jest and not as intended defamation.  203
Were the reasonable man to interpret the remarks as humorous, no liability can be found on the part 
of the jester.  Animus iniuria must once again be present. Zapiro would’ve needed to prove that he 204
never had the intent to defame Mr Zuma and that the cartoon was simply for comical purposes. If 
that were the case, in any matter, then jest as justification ground will hold water. 
hh)  Negligence 
National Media Ltd v Bogoshi  accepted negligence as a justification ground to not be held liable 205
for defamation. The mass media has on the one side a blinding influence on the views of society but 
on the other hand carries - in large part - the reputation of public figures. Most public figures serve 
South Africa in a positive sense and accordingly reckless publications, endangering their good 
name, doesn’t serve the South African society. It has been held that the media unfairly lambast 
   Daniels G ‘The case of Zuma versus Zapiro’ The Media 19 December 2012 available at    201
 www.themediaonline.co.za accessed on 01 December 2016.
   Haffajee F ‘Editorial’ Mail & Guardian 12 September 2008 available at www.mailandguardian.co.za accessed 202
 on 04 December 2015. 
   Masch v Leask 1916 TPD 114. 203
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certain public figures and are prejudiced from the word go against these figures.  It cannot  be 206
denied that many of these public figures are indeed deserving of the critique, but petty prejudice 
shouldn’t jeopardise the objective stance of free media. Nevertheless, were a media house to clearly 
act negligently by publishing defamatory remarks, they wouldn’t necessarily be held liable 
therefore. 
   The African National Congress (ANC) lament the constant media aggression against any actions done by  206
 president Jacob Zuma or other high-ranking ANC officials. ‘Media too critical of Zuma and ANC - Mkhize’ 6 
 July 2015 available at www.iafrica.com accessed on 05 December 2015.
VI  CONCLUSION 
Throughout history we have looked to leaders to guide us through the evolution of society. The 
actions of those held in high regard have always had a massive influence on the way in which 
society conducts itself. And so in our modern society, celebrities fill a remarkable position. With 
mass media and social media instantly at our disposal, we can stay up to date with the latest 
happenings in celebrities’ lives. Articles are published daily about the stars we adore and those we 
detest. The media has a massive impact on how we perceive these societal leaders. Gone are the 
days where a king is king - no matter what. Society can decide who sits on the proverbial throne 
today and so-and-so might be gone tomorrow. The smart celebrity realises this and, while he is still 
in the limelight, he uses his attention economy to make a profit. Attention economy is a theory that, 
at its core means fame makes money. 
The celebrity has a personal brand - those things which make him famous and attaches a financial 
value to his fame. His personal brand has, in and of itself, a commercial value. He can use this 
personal brand to enter the marketplace with his own products or services or to endorse the products 
or services of third parties. Like a business, the celebrity has a ‘goodwill’ attached to his brand - this 
personal goodwill is what makes him an entity unique in the marketplace. It is his reputation that 
offers his business the ability to stand out among other individuals, products or services. 
We have seen that image rights is one of the best ways in which celebrities can protect themselves 
against unfair exploitation of their brands. However, image rights are horribly underdeveloped in 
South Africa and so the celebrity should be weary to use them when his brand is unfairly exploited. 
We saw that the American approach to image rights is a strong instrument at the disposal of a 
celebrity whose image rights have been interfered upon. American image rights has developed a 
‘personal goodwill’, something we spoke of extensively throughout this discussion. The author 
argued that it would be in the best interest of South African image rights to incorporate the 
American approach in our local context. 
The author then looked at passing off. Passing off is a worthwhile way in which the celebrity can 
respond to situations where his brand has been unfairly exploited. Passing off is a reactionary 
mechanism which has remedies that can assist the celebrity plaintiff to restore the reputation of his 
brand. Passing off has been well explored in South Africa and it is interesting to attach passing off 
to the situation of the celebrity. 
Next, we considered the case of trade mark registered celebrities. Celebrities around the world have 
used the trade mark mechanism to ensure that their brands aren’t exploited without consent. Trade 
marks are very sure ways to pre-emptively see to it that their brands stay within their own hands. 
Were their brands unfairly exploited, under trade mark law, the celebrity will have a couple of 
options at his disposal to combat the infringement of his celebrity brand. 
Finally, we considered the personality right to a good name. Celebrities have the right to a good 
name and so they can use personality rights to ensure that their name remains in a good standing. 
By alleging an iniuria the celebrity plaintiff can protect his reputation against defamation We 
considered the situations where defamation can be justified but all-in-all the personality right to 
reputation is a well-established way in which the celebrity can maintain control of his brand. 
The author enjoyed researching this topic and feels that further exploration thereof is needed. He 
often felt that a lot more could be said about the different aspects of each matter but is satisfied that 
strong foundations have been laid. This discussion dealt with the commercialisation of the celebrity 
brand and the exploitation thereof and at the end of it all the author believes he has covered this 
topic in a satisfactory fashion.  
And so, to us plebeians who sometimes crave fame, the author resorts to a quotation which may 
settle our hearts and move us away from the yearning to become celebrities ourselves. Words from 
one of the most famous of them all  
‘Glory is like a circle in the water which never ceaseth to enlarge itself, till, by broad spreading, it 
disperses to naught’ 
-William Shakespeare- 
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